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I
Our knowledge is said to have “sources” such as perception, memory, and 
inference, which issue “deliverances” that we may or may not accept. Our 
senses may issue the deliverance about two adjacent lines that one is longer, 
for example, a deliverance rejected by those in the know about the Müller-Lyer 
illusion.
A deliverance of <p> to a subject S is a “saying” that p, one witnessed by 
S. Different sources correlate with different ways in which it may be said that 
p. Someone may say it literally, of course, in person or in writing, and S may 
hear it or read it. If we can believe our eyes or ears, moreover, it’s because they 
tell us things. We experience visually or aurally as if p. Normally we accept 
such deliverances of our senses, unless we detect something untoward. When 
someone or something tells us that p, we normally know who or what is doing 
so. We can tell at least that a certain voice or a certain stretch of writing is 
doing so. We can tell that we seem to see the bells toll, or seem rather to hear 
them toll. And so on.
Deliverances thus conceived make up a realm of the ostensible: ostensible 
perceptions, ostensible memories, ostensible conclusions, ostensible intuitions, 
and the like. We may or may not believe our eyes or ears, we may or may not 
trust our senses, or our memory, or our calculations or other reasonings.
In virtue of a subject’s constitution and positioning vis-á-vis a fact <p>, and 
of the subject matter or field of that fact, a deliverance to that subject will or 
will not be “safe.” It is such factors, that is to say, which determine whether or 
not <p> would be so delivered to S only if it were true. A subject in possession 
of the concept of a headache would ostensibly introspect that he suffered a 
headache only if he did, and this deliverance of introspection would thereby 
attain outright safety.
A concept of dependent safety may now be introduced by stages as follows. 
First would come a kind of relativized conditional: 
Relative to <r>, it would be so that p only if it were so that q
defined as follows:
<r&p> would be so only if <q> were so. 
In terms of this we could then define more complex conceptions of safety:
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Relativized safety.  One’s belief that p is safe relative 
to a fact <r> IFF relative to fact <r>, one would believe <p> 
only if it were so that p.
Dependent safety. One’s belief that p is safe dependently on a 
fact <r> IFF (a) one’s belief that p is not safe outright (i.e., it 
is not so that one would believe that p only if it were so that 
p), but (b) one’s belief that p is safe relative to fact <r>.
A deliverance’s being safe in virtue of certain conditions must now be 
distinguished from its being safe dependently on those conditions. Thus I may 
now enjoy a safe appearance as if there is no loud noise in my presence in 
virtue of the facts that I am not deaf, that my ears are not plugged, and so on, 
but not dependently on those facts, since my present ostensible perception 
of there being no such noise is safe outright; and since it is safe outright it is 
not dependently safe. My auditory appearance is safe in virtue of my ears being 
operative: were they inoperative I would be unable to detect the presence or 
absence of loud noises. It may be thought that if this is so, then my auditory 
appearance that silence envelops me cannot really be safe outright; it must 
then be safe only dependently on my ears being operative. But this is not 
so. My auditory appearance can be safe outright in virtue of the holding of a 
certain contingent condition, so long as the condition’s absence is a remote 
enough possibility (in the relevant context of thought or discussion), remote 
enough that it would not in fact obtain in the circumstances, though of course 
conceivably it might. 
Examples of deliverances are test results, indicator readings, eyewitness re-
ports, media reports, perceptual appearances, and even rational intuitions and 
ostensible conclusions. Contents are delivered by each such source. Acceptance 
of a deliverance as such, i.e., based on the reason that it is such a deliverance, 
constitutes knowledge only if the source is in that instance trustworthy and its 
deliverance accepted with appropriate guidance. The deliverance must be safe, 
and one must be so attuned to the trustworthiness of its source that one would 
accept its deliverances as such (for the reason that they are such deliverances) 
only if they were safe. 
It would not be enough to require that source X’s deliverances merely guide 
S to believe the contents thus delivered. It must be required rather that X’s 
deliverances guide S to accept those deliverances as such. S must accept the 
contents thus delivered as such, and this accepting must be guided by the 
deliverances (and guided also by the factors dependently on which those 
deliverances are safe). Reason: What the absence of the deliverance would 
3
Sosa: Dreams and Skeptics
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 2005
6 x 9
Dreams and Skeptics     21
properly take away is its content’s being accepted for the reason that it is thus 
delivered, on the basis of the deliverance; after all, that content itself might 
then be a deliverance of some other source, in which case it would not be 
renounced merely because the first deliverance was rejected. Moreover, if 
a source delivers a deliverance but that source is now untrustworthy, then, 
if appropriately responsive to its untrustworthiness, S will now modify his 
attitudes accordingly. How so? Not necessarily through no longer assenting 
to the deliverances of that source. For, again, what that source delivers may 
concurrently be delivered by a source known to S to be perfectly trustworthy, 
in which case S would hardly give up believing the content delivered just in 
virtue of being responsive to how untrustworthy the earlier source is in the 
circumstances. What such responsiveness will affect is rather S’s attitude to 
that untrustworthy source’s deliverances as such: i.e., S will no longer assent 
to that source’s deliverance, say <p>, as a deliverance of that source. S will no 
longer accept <p> for the reason that it is a deliverance of that source, i.e., on 
that causal basis. S will no longer be guided to accept those deliverances at 
face value, i.e., as deliverances of that source. (Your eyesight might fade while 
your hearing remains good; and you might then respond accordingly.)
As for the notion of “guiding,” this will here be understood as nothing more 
than the converse of “basing”: Factor F “guides” belief B if and only if belief B 
is “based” on F (perhaps in combination with other factors).
Again, deliverances are not beliefs or acceptances. Perceptual experience 
delivers that one of the Müller-Lyer lines is longer than the other despite the 
fact that all things considered one has no temptation to accept that deliver-
ance and believe accordingly. Any competence to be guided by a trustworthy 
source of deliverances is an intellectual virtue (or has a virtue as its basis in 
the constitution of that subject’s mind).
That sketches a safety-through-virtue view in a way that applies naturally to 
familiar sorts of examples. Thus, a bird-watcher forming beliefs normally may 
be seen to be favored over unfortunates such as an “accidental clock-gazer” 
and an “observer through a fleetingly transparent VCR/window,” as follows. In 
all three cases the subject accepts a deliverance as such, but only the normal 
bird-watcher accepts it with proper guidance. He would accept deliverances 
of his source only were they safely trustworthy. Not so for the unfortunates: 
the accidental clock-gazer, or the observer graced by fleeting transparency. 
Deliverances accepted by these unfortunates are not safe outright. What is 
more, they are not even safe dependently on factors that guide their accepting. 
One might of course know something through accepting a deliverance that is 
safe not outright but dependently on a certain condition. If one accepts such 
a deliverance guided by the holding of the relevant condition, one might still 
know the truth of the content accepted. Thus a clock that works for brief 
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seconds might still yield safe deliverances relative to its ticking. The subject 
who accepts its deliverances guided (at least in part) by its ticking might learn 
thereby what time it is, even if one who believes the clock without hearing 
it tick would not share that knowledge. The difference is that the clock does 
then issue safe deliverances concerning the time, dependently on its ticking. 
Therefore the subject who accepts its deliverances guided by its ticking can 
know thereby. However, the subject who is not guided by its ticking, who would 
believe even if the clock were stopped, may not know through accepting the 
clock’s reading, and would not know thereby unless the clock’s readings are 
safe dependently on some other factor that does guide the subject.
The subject who knows of the bird’s flight accepts a deliverance that is safe 
either outright or else dependently on a condition that guides his acceptance, 
but the subject who reads the accidentally working clock fails to know thereby 
because the deliverance he accepts is safe neither outright, nor dependently 
on any condition that then guides him. And the same goes for the subject who 
accepts his ostensible perceptions when accidentally allowed a true view through 
a fleetingly transparent window that as often as not is just a deceptive VCR.
A deliverance enables knowledge, then, only if it is safe either outright or else 
dependently on a condition by which one is guided. One then knows through 
accepting that deliverance guided in part by the holding of that condition.
Our sort of requirement, going from a psychological state with a certain 
content to the truth of that content, may thus be used to define a desirable 
cognitive status for states other than belief, for “deliverances.” These may now 
be viewed as “indications” when they satisfy our unary requirement. Thus a 
deliverance/indication I(p) may be said to “indicate” outright that p IFF I(p) 
-> p; and to indicate that p “dependently on condition C” IFF both C obtains 
and C&I(p) -> p, while it is not so that I(p) -> p. (A “deliverance,” an in-
stance of delivering, is a state of affairs wherein something seems to oneself 
to be so-a more or less complex state that may feature intellectual as well as 
sensory content.) 
The foregoing enables us to take account of externalist intuitions as follows. 
S knows that p on the basis of an indication I(p) only if ei-
ther (a) I(p) indicates the truth outright and S accepts that 
indication as such outright, or (b) for some condition C, I(p) 
indicates the truth dependently on C and S accepts that indi-
cation as such not outright but guided by C (so that S accepts 
the indication as such on the basis of C).2 
How is this affected by examples like the following?
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1. Consider the propositional form x + y = z, where x, y, and z are all 2-digit 
numbers (in the usual formulations. And suppose that S believes and would 
believe any proposition he takes to be of form F, simply because it is such a 
proposition. Some of these propositions will be true: the proposition that 22 + 
22 = 44, for example; call it P1. Consider S’s belief of P1. S has an inclination 
to believe it, and does appear to have an indication, namely F(P1), of the 
truth of P1.  After all, it is true and true outright that F(P1) -> P1. S accepts 
that indication, guided by the fact that the proposition accepted is of form F. 
So the effective indication is F(P1), where P1 is presented as a proposition of 
form F. This indication/deliverance (to S) does, again, apparently indicate the 
truth. Moreover, S does accept that indication/deliverance as such, i.e., for the 
reason that it is such an indication/deliverance. Why then is it that S fails to 
know P1, if that is how he acquires and sustains his belief?
2. On my way to the elevator I release a trash bag down the chute from 
my high-rise condo. Presumably I know my bag will soon be in the basement, 
and I know in the elevator that the bag is already there. But what if it were 
not there? That presumably would be because it was snagged somehow in 
the chute on the way down (an incredibly rare occurrence), or through some 
such happenstance. But none such could affect my belief as I descend in the 
elevator, so I would still believe that the bag was in the basement. My belief 
is not sensitive, therefore, but constitutes knowledge anyhow, and can cor-
rectly be said to do so. Such “backtracking” conditionals create problems for 
the “sensitivity” requirement that S knows that p only if S would not believe 
that p if it were false.3  By contrast, the “indications” account, in terms of an 
indication/fact conditional: I(p) -> p, seems unaffected.
Consider a “principle of exclusion” as follows:
PE In order to know a fact P one must exclude (rule 
out, know to be false) every alternative that one knows to be 
incompatible with one’s knowing that fact.
Plausible enough already on its face, this also follows directly from simple 
principles that are hard to deny, or so I have argued elsewhere.4  Let us briefly 
explore its epistemological implications.
Our principle invokes a distinctive conception of “alternatives”: when you 
believe <p>, such an alternative <a> is a condition within which you would 
not know that p. If <a> is incompatible with <p> then <a> is a condition 
within which you would not know that p, but <a> can also be incompatible 
with your knowing that p without being incompatible with <p>. Here now 
are some relevant examples, some involving alternatives in a narrower sense, 
some only in the broader sense.
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1. You see a striped equine and thereby believe you see a zebra. 
But stripes could be painted on a mule so it would look the 
same, which makes this an alternative.
2. You ostensibly see a hand and accept that at face value. But 
if you were a demon victim or an envatted brain (etc.) you 
would not know. So your being in such a skeptical scenario 
is an alternative.
3. You ostensibly see a sphere and accept that at face value. 
But if it were a cube it would not be a sphere, and you would 
not know it to be a sphere you see. So its being a cube is an 
alternative.
You might defend your belief in case 3 by saying that the very experience 
indicating to you that you see a sphere indicates also that it’s a noncube. And 
someone might argue: “If it were a cube it would look different, so I can know 
through my experience that it’s a sphere, not a cube, since my experience 
would reveal the difference.” Unfortunately, such reasoning would invoke a 
problematic criterion of sensitivity, since our experience would not thus reveal 
the difference between one’s being or not being in familiar skeptical scenarios, 
nor would it even reveal whether or not one is wrong in thinking that p, etc. If 
we are to defend your case-3 belief in a conditionals-theoretic way, therefore, 
we should look to the requirement of safety, not that of sensitivity. Our belief 
that the item is a noncube (and the corresponding visual indication guiding 
that belief) is indeed found to be not only sensitive but also safe; as is the belief 
that no demon is fooling us into thinking that it’s a sphere and not a cube; 
and as is the simpler belief that we are not wrong in thinking it to be a sphere 
and not a cube. So far so good.
Consider case 1. Advocates of safety say this: if you think you see a zebra, 
then you know only if your belief is safe: i.e., it must be that you would so believe 
only if your belief were true. What if its being a painted mule is pressed on you 
as an alternative? Would you offer a response analogous to the safety-inspired 
response in case 3? Are the corresponding beliefs in these cases relevantly alike? 
Is our belief that it’s a sphere and not a cube relevantly like the belief that it’s 
a zebra and not a striped mule? In respect of sensitivity there are bound to be 
important differences: if it were a cube and not a sphere, then one’s visual ex-
perience would be different; but if it were a striped mule and not a zebra, then 
(by hypothesis) our experience would still be the same. In order to deal with 
this, without having to grant that we can’t know it’s a zebra when we see one 
at the zoo, the sensitivity theorist sometimes invokes the difference between 
relevant and irrelevant alternatives. He does not require us to rule out that it’s 
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a striped mule we see, even though we still would not believe the equine to 
be a striped mule even if it were a striped mule, and not a zebra. Obviously, in 
the case as imagined, we are not in a position to rule out with sensitivity the 
alternative that it’s a striped mule we see. The appeal to relevance is designed 
to exempt us from having to rule out precisely such alternatives, which are 
viewed as irrelevant. And the same goes for the more radical alternatives of 
the skeptics, as in case 2. Some sensitivity theorists also adopt a linguistic 
contextualism which puts aside the question of who can know what and in 
what conditions, in order to concentrate rather on when it is correct to say 
that someone “knows.” And this is thought to be powerfully affected by what 
alternatives are somehow salient in the context of attribution. 
The safety theorist has no need of that linguistic recourse. Nor does he even 
need the distinction between the relevant and the irrelevant. He will point out 
rather about case 3 that even if it were a cube it might conceivably look like a 
sphere. In the right circumstances it might look spherical despite being cubical. 
So we are depending rather on a condition that if it were cubical then it would 
in fact look cubical and not spherical. The corresponding safety requirement 
is then that if it looked spherical it would in fact be a sphere and not a cube 
(even if it might conceivably look spherical and yet be a cube). Put another 
way, the safety requirement is satisfied so long as not easily would it then look 
like a sphere while failing to be one (given the actual set-up).5  
That works plausibly enough for outré skeptical scenarios of brain-envatting 
scientists or deceiving demons. But the case of dreams proves more troublesome. 
Too easily might one be just dreaming when one has a visual experience as if p, 
which seems to show that too easily one might be experiencing as if p without 
it being so that p. The deliverance of one’s visual experience is in that case not 
safe, not an indication after all. The remainder of this paper will focus on this 
particularly problematic skeptical problem, the problem of dreams.
II
At any given time nearly all of one’s beliefs remain latent. Few if any are 
manifest in consciousness. A belief might be manifest upon being formed, when 
one makes up one’s mind. Or it might rise to consciousness from storage. To 
manifest one’s belief thus in consciousness is to judge or to assent or to avow 
consciously, at least in foro interno. The same is true of one’s intentions, few 
of which rise to consciousness at any given time for assent or avowal. 
One might assent to a proposition, moreover, or to a course of action, while 
lacking the corresponding belief or intention, or even while believing or in-
tending the opposite. Actions speak louder than words; louder than conscious 
assentings, too, as with deep-seated prejudices that survive conscious disavowal.
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For convenience, let’s use ‘affirmation’ for assentings to propositions and 
‘volition’ for assentings to courses of action (including simple actions as a 
limiting case). In these terms, we can now ask: How do beliefs/affirmations 
and intentions/volitions figure in dreams? Do dreams have the psychological 
depth required for the presence of beliefs and intentions? Do the characters in 
one’s dreams have beliefs and intentions? Plausibly they do, myself included as 
protagonist or spectator in my dreams. As protagonist or spectator in my dream, 
I would seem to enjoy conscious experiences. And I would seem also to assent 
consciously, to make affirmations and volitions. These are made in the dream, 
of course, where one also hosts beliefs and intentions, and enjoys experiences.
When in my dream, p-or, for short, Dp, reality tends not to follow suit, so 
that in actuality, not-p-that is, A~p? When in my dream I am chased by a lion, 
that poses no danger to my skin. This independence of dreams from reality is 
what the skeptic needs. Ironically, it also endangers his reasoning. Take physical 
propositions, p, about the layout of the physical world around us. For no such 
proposition does Dp entail Ap. What about mental propositions, m, about 
how it is in one’s own mind? Does Dm entail Am? No, even if in my dream I 
believe that a lion is after me, and even if in my dream I intend to keep running 
as long as it is still after me, in actuality I have no such belief or intention.
What about mental propositions, c, about one’s current conscious states, 
whether conscious experiences or conscious assentings? Does Dc entail Ac? 
Consider, for example, a conscious assenting to a course of action of one’s own, 
a volition. If in my dream I make a volition, do I also in actuality make that 
volition? Suppose in a dream one succumbs willingly to a temptress, indeed to 
a neighbor’s wife turned in the dream into a sultry object of desire. Does one 
then violate the Biblical injunction against coveting one’s neighbor’s wife? 
Indeed, does one go even further? Does one then consciously assent to the 
sinful act? If so, does one deserve discredit, even censure? If one has sinned 
not only in one’s dream, but in actuality, at least in one’s heart, it is hard to 
see how one could escape discredit. That has near-zero plausibility, however, 
about as little as does assigning discredit to a storyteller/protagonist for his 
misdeeds in a story spun for a child. (One might blame him for telling such 
a story to such an audience, but that is different; one does not thereby blame 
him for doing what he does in the story.)
One might try to circumvent this through appeal to the unusual circum-
stances. Although in dreaming one does actually assent to misdeeds, perhaps 
even to evil deeds, perhaps its being just a dream protects one from discredit? 
This seems wholly implausible. Why should the circumstance of its being a 
dream have that effect? If sudden paralysis renders one unable to carry out 
one’s deplorable intentions, this does not protect one from discredit, or from 
the full weight of the Biblical injunction. How then can we be protected by 
the relevant disengagement of one’s brain from the physical causal order? And 
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how then can we gain protection through disengagement of one’s inner mental 
life, as in a dream?
It seems wholly preferable to think of dreams on the model of daydreams, 
or imaginings, or stories, all fictions of a sort, or quasi-fictions. The fact that 
in one’s dream one is in a certain mental state hence should not be thought to 
entail that in actuality one is in that state, not even when the state is one of 
mentally assenting to a course of action of one’s own, of making a volition. By 
parity of reasoning, what is true of volitions seems equally true of affirmations, 
moreover, of mental assentings to propositions.
What then of experiences, conscious sensory experiences? What of mental 
propositions, e, about one’s current conscious sensory experiences? Does De 
entail Ae? Here at least, it may be thought, we can plausibly draw the line. 
But consider the consequences. It is now supposed that in respect of such 
experiences it is just as if a lion is after me. Yet I form neither the belief that 
this is so nor the intention to escape. Am I not now deserving of discredit? Is 
it not irrational of me to host such experiences without the appropriate beliefs 
and intentions?
Here one might of course dig in one’s heels, saying that the dream experiences 
are real enough, unlike the beliefs and intendings, and even the affirmations 
and volitions. But we are not irrational in failing to form obviously appropriate 
beliefs, since being in a dream state disables us, just as would being tied down 
in a chair so that one cannot act in obviously appropriate ways. But this seems 
strangely arbitrary. Why are the experiences real but the assentings unreal? 
They seem on a par in the dream. Again it seems best to reject the move from 
“In my dream I experience, visually and aurally, as if a lion is after me” to “In 
actuality I experience thus.”
If we do think of dreams on the model of fiction, moreover, this highlights 
a fact that seems obvious enough in any case. Dreaming that p does not entail 
thinking that p, at least not in the sense of affirming that p, mentally assenting. 
And if one does manage both to dream that p while concurrently affirming 
that p (which seems hard enough to do, perhaps impossible), still the dreaming 
and the affirming must be kept apart as distinct occurrences, either of which 
might have occurred without the other.
Let us next consider what effect this line of thought may have on the tra-
ditional skeptical argument from dreams. Here is a formulation:
1. My reason for now thinking, as I do, that I see a fire, is that 
I experience as if I see a fire. 
2. But this might all be so only in a dream, in which case I 
would see no fire (at least not thereby). 
3. Yet I have no basis to rule out the possibility that it all be 
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so only in a dream. 
4. For my basis would have to reside in my experience and it 
is precisely the import of this basis that is in question through 
the possibility that I experience thus only in a dream.
It might be replied that this goes wrong already with the first step, that if I 
do think I see a fire and base this on an experience, none of this can be hap-
pening only in a dream. For we have seen that Dm does not imply Am, that 
one’s dreaming that one is in a certain mental state does not imply that one is 
actually in that mental state. And the same goes for one’s dreaming that one 
undergoes a linked set of such states. Suppose I were dreaming that I base on 
a present experience my thought that I see a fire. Then I would not thereby 
think I see a fire based on my present experience. Indeed, if it were a dream, as 
specified, then it would be an open question (at best) whether I then do base 
a thought that I see a fire on an experience as if I see a fire, and it would even 
be an open question (at best) whether I so much as have any such thought or 
any such experience. 
It might even be held that one’s dreaming as specified rules out, whether 
metaphysically or nomologically, the possibility that one actually have at that 
same time any such thoughts or experiences. This suggests that traditional 
formulations of such skeptical reasoning, Descartes’s included, may not go 
deep enough. For such a dream argument puts in question not only our sup-
posed perceptual knowledge but even our supposed introspective knowledge, 
our supposed takings of the given. It puts in question not only our supposed 
knowledge that we see a fire, but even our supposed knowledge that we think 
we see a fire, or experience as if we see a fire. How so?
Suppose I (introspectively) think that I think I see a fire. Might it not be 
just a dream? Might I not thereby be dreaming that I think I see a fire? And 
if I am thereby dreaming that I think I see a fire, then perhaps I do not really 
think I see a fire, after all.
But hold on. If I really think that I think I see a fire, then I cannot thereby 
be dreaming that I think I see a fire. That is at least so, as remarked earlier, on 
the understanding of ‘thinking’ as ‘(conscious) affirming’. Don’t we thus secure 
privileged access after all, protection from the possibility that it be just a dream?
Fair enough. But compare now the case where I think I see a fire. If I really 
think that, then here again I cannot thereby be dreaming that I see a fire. So, 
we seem to have equally privileged access to the fact that we see a fire, at least 
equally privileged in respect of protection from the dream argument.
We may accordingly retreat to a thinner, less committed, concept of think-
ing, where even dreaming and imagining are themselves forms of “thinking.” 
On the thicker notion of thinking, if I imagine that p, hypothesize that p, or 
dream that p, it is not the case that I thereby think that p; I may then not even 
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think that p at all, and may even think that not-p, perhaps even consciously, 
at least in that same specious present. On the thinner notion of thinking, by 
contrast, in imagining that p one thereby does think that p. And the same is 
now true of dreaming. On the thinner notion, in dreaming that p, one does 
thereby think that p. More idiomatically, we should perhaps say rather that in 
thus dreaming or imagining that p, one has or at least entertains the thought 
that p. So, “thinking that p” in the weaker sense would amount to “having or 
at least entertaining the thought that p.”
Now we do have a kind of privileged access to a part or aspect of our mental 
life. For in the thinner sense of ‘thinking’ it is now true that if I think that I 
think then I must be right, even if in thinking that I then think, I am thereby 
dreaming. Or, in the longer but more idiomatic formulation: If I have the (meta-)
thought that I have a thought, then I must be right, my (meta-)thought must 
be true, even if in having that (meta-)thought I am only dreaming.
Despite our having attained such privilege, we are now in an epistemo-
logical dead end. For the conscious episode thus privileged, thus protected 
from falsehood, is not of a sort that could constitute knowledge. Imagining, 
daydreaming, storytelling-these are not the stuff of knowledge. Such episodes 
can have truth-evaluable propositional content, true enough. The problem is 
rather that the propositional attitudes involved are not of a sort to constitute 
knowledge, are not those of main interest in epistemology. True, one might 
have the thought that p by affirming that p. So, a case in which one has the 
thought that p may be a case of knowledge. But this knowledge would be con-
stituted not just by the having of the thought, but by the affirming. Having the 
thought that p, which might derive simply from one’s imagining that p, is not 
then the locus of knowledge. But it is only this state that is privileged by the 
Cartesian argument, the state of having the thought that one has a thought. 
It is only this thin, determinable state that is dream-proof, since even if one 
were dreaming that p, one would still be having the thought that p (in the 
sense in which the narrator has the thought that there was an old lady who 
lived in a shoe, without affirming that there ever was anyone like that). But 
this dream-proof state is not a state that can constitute knowledge. The knowl-
edge-constituting state would have to be that of affirming that p, of thinking, 
in the thicker sense, that p. Anyhow, this would be the state constitutive of 
conscious knowledge that p.
Uncowed, a Cartesian might now insist that the cogito need not be restricted 
to weak, thin thinking. It can go beyond the fact that one could not possibly 
have the thought that one has a thought without being right. It can reason 
rather more thickly that one could not affirm that one affirms something, 
without being right. So, we can after all mount a cogito-style defense of a state 
that can constitute conscious knowledge, namely the state of consciously 
assenting, of affirming.
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Yes, but how successful is this defense against the dream argument? What 
of the possibility that right now one might just be dreaming, in which case 
one would be affirming nothing? How does one circumvent this possibility?
Compare the thinner reasoning, about one’s having the thought that one 
has a thought. This is also a self-verifying (thin) thought. But it has in addi-
tion something missing from the stronger cogito-style reasoning, about one’s 
affirming that one affirms something: namely, being dream-proof. Suppose 
one faces the possibility that one now is only dreaming. This would mean 
that one is really affirming nothing. But it would not mean that one is not 
having the thought that one is having a thought.
So, my present thought that I am having a thought is not only guaranteed 
to be right; it is also one I would not seem to have without having it, not 
even if I were dreaming. Compare my right now affirming that I am affirm-
ing something. This too is guaranteed to be right. But, unlike the thinner 
thought, it could appear to be thought, without really being thought. If I were 
just dreaming now, then I would be dreaming that I was affirming that I am 
affirming something. But I would not be affirming anything at all. So things 
would in a way seem subjectively just as they do now, if it was a realistic 
enough dream. But I would just be having thoughts, without really thinking 
in the thicker sense, without affirming anything.
The Cartesian might protest that the advantage of the cogito emerges 
through a practical syllogism. One reasons that one would be guaranteed to 
be right in assenting to it, and one aims at truth, so one can now assent to the 
cogito as a conclusion of a practical syllogism (supposing that no conflicting 
value now defeats one’s aiming at the truth). But this does not help with our 
problem. For, if one is dreaming, then one cannot really be going through any 
such reasoning. One is only dreaming that one is doing so. So things could 
seem just as they do now, indistinguishably, and yet one would not have the 
basis that apparently justifies one now in assenting to the conclusion of one’s 
supposed practical reasoning. Therefore, it cannot be such reasoning that 
is giving one justification for assenting to the cogito. To suppose that such 
reasoning is nevertheless giving us our justification for thus assenting, is to 
stamp one’s foot with the claim that even if one could not tell the difference 
between one’s present state and the dream state of apparent practical rea-
soning, nevertheless the mere fact that one is reasoning practically, if one is, 
suffices to provide one with the required justification. But many would see 
this as an unacceptable begging of the question against the dream argument.
The Cartesian might here dig in his heels somewhat deeper. He might say 
that we do not need the stronger protection enjoyed only by thin thought. 
Despite the apparent question-begging, the protection enjoyed by thick 
thought is quite enough to secure Cartesian, cogito-style knowledge against 
the skeptic. But consider the fact that if one sees that here is a fire, then one 
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must be right: it must be that here indeed is a fire. What advantage then does 
the cogito have over such perceptual knowledge (by which I mean, here and 
in what follows, the thick cogito). In each case there is a state, one involving 
a propositional content <p> such that if one is in that state, then one’s state is 
guaranteed to be “right” in that it is guaranteed to be so that p. What advantage 
does the cogito now enjoy over one’s seeing that p? Why say that the cogito is 
privileged? In each case one can seem to be in the state without being in the 
state, since in each case one might just be dreaming that one is in the state. 
And in each case, if one is in the state, then the propositional content of the 
state is true, so being in the state guarantees that the state is in that sense right. 
What then distinguishes the cogito, so as to make it especially privileged, with 
a status not shared by simply seeing that p? Maybe an answer is possible. But 
it would be nice to see one that is actual.6  
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Notes
1 This paper draws on an account of animal knowl-
edge, developed in earlier publications, in 
terms of a sort of tracking that replaces sen-
sitivity (if it had not been true that p, the 
S would not have believed it) with safety (S 
would have believed it only if true) and adds 
a requirement that this safety must itself de-
rive not accidentally but from the exercise 
of epistemic virtue. Here that account will 
eventually confront a special problem posed by 
one skeptical scenario in particular, that of 
dreaming, which is in important respects more 
virulent than more outré scenarios such as that 
of the envatted brain or the evil demon.
 
2 To qualify as not only necessary but also suf-
ficient our condition would need to be modified 
so as to require that the guiding indication 
be “fundamental” for that subject at that time: 
i.e., not based on a deeper, more general indi-
cation. (Also we would need to take into account 
the requirement that one’s belief be so guided 
virtuously; and considerations of perspective 
must also be given their due.)
 
Dreams and Skeptics      31
14
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 35 [2005], No. 1, Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol35/iss1/2
6 x 9
3 This sort of problem is also presented by Jona-
than Vogel in “Tracking, Closure, and Inductive 
Knowledge,” in S. Luper-Foy, ed., The Possibility 
of Knowledge (Rowman&Littlefield, 1987), and is 
endorsed by Stewart Cohen in his “Contextualist 
Solutions to Epistemological Problems: Skepti-
cism, Gettier, and the Lottery,” Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy 76 (1998): 289-306.
 
4 “How to Resolve the Pyrrhonian Problematic: A 
Lesson from Descartes,” Philosophical Studies 
LXXXV (1997): 229-49.
 
5 Concerning the zebra we should distinguish between a case where the animal 
seen might too easily be a striped mule: where, for example, that zoo might 
too easily, and maybe does already, display striped mules instead of zebras. 
In such a situation clearly one does not know it to be really a zebra one 
sees. The safety requirement explains this through the fact that even if it 
looked like a zebra, and one believed accordingly, it might too easily be not 
a zebra but a striped mule. So far so good. But what if the zoo in question 
is incorruptible, and would never descend to such deceit. Now the safety 
requirement seems satisfied, and we are able to say that one knows it to be a 
zebra one sees. Or, at least one can say that as far as the safety requirement 
is concerned. The safety requirement is after all just a necessary condition. 
So the mere fact that a belief satisfies that requirement does not commit 
us to counting it a case of knowledge. On the contrary, whether or not one 
knows in such a case will plausibly depend also on why it is that one believes 
as one does. And here one must look to the “habit” of thought that leads 
from the perceived look to the corresponding classification. Why does one 
base one’s belief that it’s a zebra on that look?
 6 In forthcoming work I hope to lay out a more positive response to this more 
powerful dream skepticism, with its indictment of the cogito.
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